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Abstract
We present a proof of principle for the phenomenon of the tragedy of the
commons that is at the center of many theories on the evolution of cooperation.
We establish the tragedy in the context of a general chemostat model with two
species, the cooperator and the cheater. Both species have the same growth
rate function and yield constant, but the cooperator allocates a portion of
the nutrient uptake towards the production of a public good -the “Commons”
in the Tragedy- which is needed to digest the externally supplied nutrient.
The cheater on the other hand does not produce this enzyme, and allocates
all nutrient uptake towards its own growth. We prove that when the cheater
is present initially, both the cooperator and the cheater will eventually go
extinct, hereby confirming the occurrence of the tragedy. We also show that
without the cheater, the cooperator can survive indefinitely, provided that at
least a low level of public good or processed nutrient is available initially. Our
results provide a predictive framework for the analysis of cooperator-cheater
dynamics in a powerful model system of experimental evolution.
1 Introduction
Cooperative behaviors abound across all domains of life, from animals to microbes
[11, 28]. Yet, their evolution and maintenance is difficult to explain [18, 29, 30].
Why would an individual carry out a costly behavior for the benefit of the group?
Cheaters that reap the benefits of cooperation without paying the costs would gain a
competitive advantage and invade the population. This conflict of interest between
the individual and the group is also known as the tragedy of the commons described
by Hardin [15]. To illustrate the tragedy, Hardin considers a scenario first sketched
by Lloyd more than 100 years earlier [19], a pasture that is shared by herdsmen. It
is in each herdsman’s best interest to add additional cattle to the pasture, because
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he gains the profits from individual cattle sales, but shares the costs of overgrazing
with all other herdsmen. This behavior is pursued until, ultimately, the commons
is destroyed to the detriment of all.
The problem of cooperation has received considerable attention in the micro-
bial realm [28, 1, 9]. Many microbes perform cooperative behaviors such as biofilm
formation, virulence, and collective nutrient acquisition. Often, these behaviors are
accomplished by secreted products referred to as public goods [28, 30]. Public goods
are costly to produce for the individual but provide a collective benefit to the lo-
cal group. They include extracellular enzymes that degrade complex food sources,
siderophores that scavenge iron from the environment, and secreted toxins and an-
tibiotics that harm other cells. It has been shown in several microbial systems that
public goods can be shared within a population of cells, benefitting cells other than
the focal producer [6, 14, 22, 24, 13]. For example, when the bacterium Pseudomonas
aeruginosa is grown on a proteinaceous substrate, mutants deficient in protease se-
cretion enrich in co-culture with the wild-type parent [6, 24]. These non-producing
strains are termed obligate cheaters: They cannot grow by themselves, but they have
a relative growth advantage in mixed cultures with cooperators. Because cheater
enrichment inevitably imposes a burden on the population, the expected outcome
is a collapse of the population [23]. This outcome been shown experimentally in a
few cases [22, 7, 5]. Often, however, cooperative behaviors are stably maintained
and hence, the focus has largely been on mechanisms that avoid a tragedy of the
commons [2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 17, 26, 27, 31].
To our knowledge, the notion that obligate cheating behavior constitutes a
tragedy of the commons and leads to population collapse has not been mathemat-
ically proven. Here, we consider the dynamics between cooperators and obligate
cheaters in a continuous culture system. Continuous cultures or chemostats enable
microbial culturing at a specified density and growth rate through the constant
dilution of the culture with fresh growth medium [25]. There is an extensive mathe-
matical theory that describes population dynamics in the chemostat [25]. We prove
that obligate cheaters inevitably increase in frequency until cooperation via public
goods is no longer sustainable, eventually leading to wash-out and population col-
lapse. We also show that the dynamics of the cooperators in the absence of cheaters
exhibits bistability: Depending on the initial condition of the system, cooperators
will either eventually persist, or go extinct. Numerical simulations show that it is
possible that the cooperators persist when initially there is no processed nutrient,
and only a small level of enzyme. In summary, populations solely comprised of co-
operators have a chance to persist, but they are doomed whenever cheaters arise,
even at low initial frequency.
2 The model and the tragedy
We propose a chemostat model where S denotes the concentration of the unprocessed
nutrient, P of the processed nutrient, E of the enzyme and X1 is the concentration
of the cooperator who produces an enzyme required for nutrient processing, and X2
of the cheater who does not produce the enzyme. The mass-balance equations for
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these variables are as follows:
dS
dt
(t) = D(t)(S0(t)− S)−G(E, S) (1)
dP
dt
(t) = G(E, S)− 1
γ
(X1 +X2)F (P )−D(t)P (2)
dE
dt
(t) = (1− q)X1F (P )−D(t)E (3)
dX1
dt
(t) = X1 (qF (P )−D(t)) (4)
dX2
dt
(t) = X2 (F (P )−D(t)) (5)
The operating conditions of the chemostat may fluctuate in time, and they are char-
acterized by D(t), the dilution rate, and S0(t), the concentration of the unprocessed
nutrient at the inflow. Both are non-negative functions of time, and additional as-
sumptions for these functions will be introduced below. Unprocessed nutrient is
converted into processed nutrient by means of the enzyme. Processed nutrient is
produced at rate G(E, S). The per capita consumption rate of processed nutrient
by both species is the same, and denoted by 1
γ
F (P ), where γ is the yield of this
process, taking a value in (0, 1), and which is also assumed to be the same for both
species. The cooperator allocates a proportion q, a fixed value in (0, 1), of the pro-
cessed nutrient it has consumed, towards its own growth. The remaining fraction
(1 − q) goes towards the production of the enzyme which is needed to process the
unprocessed nutrient. The cheater allocates all processed nutrient it has taken up
towards growth. A cartoon of this chemostat model is presented in Figure 1.
We make the following minimal assumptions about the functions G and F :
H1: G : R+ ×R+ → R+ is C1, G(0, S) = G(E, 0) = 0 for all E ≥ 0 and S ≥ 0, and
F : R+ → R+ is C1, and F (0) = 0.
This assumption merely implies that there is no conversion of unprocessed nutrient
into processed nutrient, when the enzyme or the unprocessed nutrient is missing;
similarly there is no growth of either species, or of the enzyme, when the processed
nutrient is missing.
For the dilution rate D(t), and input nutrient concentration S0(t), we assume
the following:
H2: The functions D(t) and S0(t) are continuous for all t ≥ 0, and there exist
positive bounds D and D¯ such that D ≤ D(t) ≤ D¯ for all t ≥ 0, and
positive bounds S0 and S¯0 such that S0 ≤ S0(t) ≤ S¯0 for all t ≥ 0.
Our Main Result, which is proved in the Appendix, establishes the tragedy of
the commons:
Theorem 1. Assume that H1 and H2 hold, and assume that the initial condition
of (1) − (5) is such that X2(0) > 0; that is, the cheater is present initially. Then
(P (t), E(t), X1(t), X2(t))→ (0, 0, 0, 0) as t→∞.
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Figure 1: Cartoon of the chemostat with two competing bacterial types: Species
are indicated in bold and rates are indicated in italics. X1, cooperator; X2, cheater;
S, nutrient substrate; S0, unprocessed nutrient substrate in inflow; P , processed
nutrient; E, enzyme; D(t), dilution rate, 1/yF (P ), per capita nutrient consumption
rate; F (P ), growth rate; q and 1 − q, proportions of nutrient allocated towards
growth and enzyme production, respectively.
Figure 2 depicts the tragedy in case of mass action kinetics G(E, S) = kES,
and Monod uptake function F (P ) = mP/(a + P ). The equations have been scaled
such that S0 and D are both constant equal to one. Initial data are as follows:
S(0) = 1, P (0) = 0, E(0) = 0.8, X1(0) = 0.2, X2(0) = 0.03. The cooperator peaks
early and declines sharply as the cheater continues to thrive, reaching a maximum
followed by a rapid decline.
We show next that the tragedy also occurs in cases where the processing of the
substrate into processed nutrient proceeds in more than one step. First, let us single
out the biochemical reaction taking place in model (1) − (5). Borrowing notation
from (bio)chemistry, this reaction can be represented as follows:
S + E → P + E,
where the reaction rate of formation of processed nutrient is g(e, s), expressed in
rescaled variables (see the Appendix for the rescaling). If we would only model this
process, and ignore enzyme production, inflow of substrate, and outflow of substrate,
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Figure 2: Time series of the components of system (1)− (5), where S0 = 1, D = 1,
q = 0.8, γ = 1, G(E, S) = kES, F (P ) = mP/(a + P ) with k = 20, m = 5 and
a = 0.05. Initial data: S(0) = 1, P (0) = 0, E(0) = 0.1, X1(0) = 0.2, X2(0) = 0.02.
enzyme and processed nutrient, we would have the following mass balance:
ds
dt
(t) = −g(e, s)
de
dt
(t) = 0
dp
dt
(t) = g(e, s)
Suppose now that the biochemistry describing the conversion of substrate into
processed nutrient takes occurs via an intermediate step:
S + E ←→ C → P + E,
where C represents an intermediate complex formed by the action of the enzyme
on the substrate. Let us for simplicity assume that the reaction rates are of the
mass action type (with respective rate constants k1 and k−1 for the first reversible
reaction, and k2 for the second reaction), then the mass balance model for this 2-step
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biochemical reaction network is:
ds
dt
(t) = −k1es+ k−1c
de
dt
(t) = −k1es+ k−1c+ k2c
dc
dt
(t) = k1es− k−1c− k2c
dp
dt
(t) = k2c
The key property for this network is the conservation of the following quantity:
s(t) + e(t) + 2c(t) + p(t),
which is easily verified by showing that its derivative with respect to time is zero.
If we integrate this biochemical reaction network in our chemostat model, then we
obtain the following scaled chemostat model:
ds
dt
(t) = D(t)(S0(t)− s)− k1es+ k−1c (6)
dp
dt
(t) = k2c− (x1 + x2) f(p)−D(t)p (7)
de
dt
(t) = (1− q)x1f(p)− k1es+ k−1c+ k2c−D(t)e (8)
dc
dt
(t) = k1es− k−1c− k2c−D(t)c (9)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1 (qf(p)−D(t)) (10)
dx2
dt
(t) = x2 (f(p)−D(t)) (11)
We show in the last section of the Appendix that the tragedy continues to hold,
in the sense that the conclusion of Theorem 1 remains valid for this more general
system.
Of course, more complicated biochemical reaction networks of the digestion pro-
cess, with multiple intermediate complexes C1, . . . Cn:
S + E ←→ C1 ←→ · · · ←→ Cn → P + E
could be used here instead, and the tragedy would continue to hold in such cases.
The key property is that the mass balance equations corresponding to these networks
should exhibit a conservation law to guarantee the boundedness of the solutions of
the chemostat model which integrates this biochemistry. Most reasonable biochem-
ical reaction networks do indeed possess such conservation laws.
3 Cooperators can persist when cheaters are ab-
sent
We have shown that when cheaters are present initially, the total population of coop-
erators and cheaters, is doomed. Next we investigate what happens when cheaters
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are absent by considering a special case of the chemostat model (1) − (5) with
X2 = 0, and constant operating parameters D and S
0, which are both assumed to
be positive:
dS
dt
(t) = D(S0 − S)− EG(S) (12)
dP
dt
(t) = EG(S)− 1
γ
X1F (P )−DP (13)
dE
dt
(t) = (1− q)X1F (P )−DE (14)
dX1
dt
(t) = X1 (qF (P )−D) (15)
Notice that the nutrient processing rate has been specialized to EG(S), implying
that it is proportional to the enzyme concentration E, and a possibly nonlinear func-
tion of the nutrient G(S). We replace assumption H1, by the following assumption,
which introduces a monotonicity condition for F , and monotonicity and concavity
condition for G:
H1’: G : R+ → R+ is C2, G(0) = 0, dG/dS(S) > 0 for all S > 0, and
d2G/dS2(S) ≤ 0 for all S ≥ 0, and
F : R+ → R+ is C1, F (0) = 0, dF/dP (P ) > 0 for all P > 0.
The concavity condition for G will be used to limit the number of steady states of
this system. The most commonly used choices for the functions for F and G are
Monod functions (i.e. F (P ) = mP/(a+P ), where a and m are positive parameters),
which satisfy these assumptions. But note that a linear function G(S) = kS, with
k > 0 is allowed as well. In other words, the processing rate of nutrient (per unit of
enzyme) does not necessarily have to saturate for large S-values.
The following dichotomy -global extinction, or bistability- is proved in the Ap-
pendix, and shows that the cooperator may persist when there are no cheaters; it
refers to a scalar, nonlinear equation (43), which is given in the Appendix as well.
Theorem 2. Suppose that H1’ holds, and that P ∗ := F−1
(
D
q
)
< S0.
1. If equation (43) has no solutions, then the washout steady state (0, 0, 0, 0) is
globally asymptotically stable for system (12)− (15).
2. If equation (43) has two distinct solutions, then system (12)−(14) has 3 steady
states, the washout steady state (0, 0, 0, 0) and two positive steady states E1 and
E2. The washout steady state and E2 are locally asymptotically stable, and
E1 is a saddle with a three-dimensional stable manifold, and one-dimensional
unstable manifold. The stable manifold is the common boundary of the regions
of attraction of the washout steady state and E2. Every solution of system
(12) − (15) converges to one of the three steady states. Persistence of the
cooperator occurs for all initial conditions contained in the region of attraction
of E2, and initial conditions on the stable manifold of the saddle E1.
Figure 3 illustrates the persistence of the cooperator in the absence of cheaters,
even when there is no processed nutrient, and only a little amount of enzyme initially.
7
Notice that the initial condition used in the simulation for Figure 3 is the same as
the initial condition used for Figure 2, and the model parameters are the same as
well. Nevertheless, the fate of the cooperator is very different: it goes extinct when
the cheater is present initially (Figure 2), but persists otherwise (Figure 3).
4 Conclusion
Although the tragedy of the commons is such a pervasive notion in the recent de-
velopments of theories about the evolution of cooperation, we were unable to find
any mathematical models that have rigorously analyzed an important group-level
effect: the collapse of a population as a consequence of the dynamic interaction be-
tween cooperating and cheating individuals. Here we have proved mathematically
that the tragedy of the commons occurs in a chemostat system with cooperators
that supply a public good required for growth, and cheaters that do not. The sole
difference between cooperators and cheaters in this system is the cost associated
with public good production, which is only experienced by the cooperator. While
the cooperator diverts a fraction of the ingested nutrient from growth to public good
production, the cheater invests everything in growth. We assume that there are no
pleiotropic costs to cheating, and that the environment is well mixed, disregarding
spatial structure as a major factor that promotes cooperation [29, 30]. Our results
support the occurrence of the tragedy of the commons as a consequence of the selfish
actions of individuals that result in the complete collapse of the shared public good
[15, 23]. When this public good is essential for growth, the tragedy is manifested by
the extinction of the whole group [22, 8, 5].
To understand how the tragedy of the commons arises in the chemostat, we
perform a simple thought-experiment. Assume that initially there are no cheaters
(X2(0) = 0), and suppose that the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold. If the initial
condition of system (12) − (15) is contained in the region of attraction of the lo-
cally stable steady state E2, the solution will converge to, and eventually settles
at this steady state. Numerical simulations (Figure 3) show that this can happen
even if there is only a low initial amount of enzyme (E(0) is small), and no initial
processed nutrient (P (0) = 0). The cooperator-only population therefore persists.
However, if cheaters do suddenly appear -for example by mutation or by invasion
into the environment- even in extremely low numbers, Theorem 1 shows that the
total population of cooperators and cheaters is doomed, confirming the tragedy of
the commons. One of the two proofs of Theorem 1 gives clues on how this happens:
The ratio of cooperators to cheaters will always decrease. It may appear as if the
cheaters will overtake the cooperators, and at least for a while, this is indeed what
happens. However, in the long run there are not enough cooperators around to
produce the enzyme levels required for nutrient processing, and this leads to the
extinction of cheaters and cooperators alike.
To put our results in context, it is useful to quote from Hardin’s original inter-
pretation of the tragedy, see [15]:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all.
It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on
the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries
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Figure 3: Time series of the components of system (12)−(15), where S0 = 1, D = 1,
q = 0.8, γ = 1, G(E, S) = kES, F (P ) = mP/(a + P ) with k = 20, m = 5 and
a = 0.05. Initial data: S(0) = 1, P (0) = 0, E(0) = 0.1, X1(0) = 0.2.
because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast
well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a
reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates
tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or
implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, ”What is the utility to me of adding one
more animal to my herd?” This utility has one negative and one positive component:
1. The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since
the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal,
the positive utility is nearly +1.
2. The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by
one or more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by
all herdsman, the negative utility for any particular decision making herdsman
is only a fraction of −1.
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Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.
And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all.
It is interesting to note that Hardin’s verbal description of the tragedy makes
no explicit distinction between cooperators and cheaters, which is in contrast with
recent interpretations of the tragedy in evolutionary biology [23]. In natural popu-
lations there are many different ways individuals can cooperate or cheat, and clearly
articulating the distinction between both types is necessary to correlate it to the
occurrence of the tragedy [23]. In its essence, the tragedy of the commons is the
depletion of a common resource or a public good by the selfish action of competing
individuals, thereby decreasing the average fitness of all individuals.
In the realm of game theory, the tragedy is described by a public good game
or an N -person prisoner’s dilemma [16]. In these types of games, selfishness is the
superior strategy or Nash equilibrium [16]. While it can predict winning strategies,
however, game theory does not generally consider the feedback of individual behavior
phenotypes on group productivity.
According to [23], the exploitation of different types of resources can give rise to
a tragedy of the commons. The first, which fits Hardin’s analogy described above,
involves the selfish exploitation of a common, extrinsic resource to the point of
complete depletion, which causes all individuals to perish. The second type involves
resources that are themselves the product of social behavior. In this case, the
resource is a public good that is either formed by cooperation, or by restraining from
conflict. Cooperation via public goods is pervasive in microbial social behavior, and
it is also the case that we have described here with our model (1)− (5). As we have
seen, the tragedy arises when non-cooperating cheaters reap the benefits provided by
cooperators, without paying the costs. Microbial cooperative behaviors vulnerable
to cheating include extracellular secretions such as enzymes and metabolites [12, 20,
22]. A particularly compelling example is the altruistic investment in the non-spore
parts of a multicellular fruiting body in myxobacteria [7].
A different, more abstract, type of public good involves individuals restraining
from potential conflict. A tragedy arises if the costs invested in compettitive be-
havior decrease overall productivity. In this case, less emphasis is placed on the
depletion of extrinsic resources. A relevant example comes from another chemostat
study which investigated the outcome of social conflict between different metabolic
strategies in yeast, respiration and fermentation [20]. Respirers use glucose slowly
but efficiently, whereas fermenters use glucose fast but wastefully. Thus, respira-
tion is the strategy that provides the highest group-level benefit. Nevertheless, as
shown experimentally and confirmed by simulation, fermenters are favored and fully
displace respirers during glucose-limited growth in a chemostat [20]. Notably, in
this system, as in restraint from conflict in general, one strategy does not obligately
depend on the other for its success.
As we have proven in this study, population collapse is inevitable in an obligate
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relationship, because the cooperator to cheater ratio always decreases. Eventually
the cheater becomes so dominant that too little public good is produced by the
cooperator, leading to the extinction of both types. The differential equation frame-
work presented here will permit the in-depth analysis of mechanisms that promote
cooperation. The contribution of specific parameters or functional forms can be
investigated. For example, how much higher would growth yield or nutrient up-
take rates have to be in a cooperator compared to a cheater to make public good
cooperation sustainable?
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
By scaling the state variables of system (1)− (5) as follows:
s = S
p = P
e =
E
γ
x1 =
X1
γ
x2 =
X2
γ
,
and introducing the rescaled functions
g(e, s) := G(γe, s)
f(p) := F (P ),
we obtain the following scaled model:
ds
dt
(t) = D(t)(S0(t)− s)− g(e, s) (16)
dp
dt
(t) = g(e, s)− (x1 + x2)f(p)−D(t)p (17)
de
dt
(t) = (1− q)x1f(p)−D(t)e (18)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1 (qf(p)−D(t)) (19)
dx2
dt
(t) = x2 (f(p)−D(t)) (20)
Notice that H1, which holds for the rate functions G(E, S) and F (P ), is also
valid for the scaled rate functions g(e, s) and f(p).
The total mass of this scaled model,
m = s+ p+ e+ x1 + x2,
satisfies a linear equation:
dm
dt
(t) = D(t)(S0(t)−m), (21)
which is easily verified by adding all the equations of the scaled model. This equa-
tion, and the upper bound for S0(t) in H2 imply that the following family of compact
sets
Ω = {(s, p, e, x1, x2) | s ≥ 0, p ≥ 0, e ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0,m ≤ S¯0 + },
are forward invariant sets of the scaled model, for all  ≥ 0.
The Main Result, Theorem 1, is an immediate Corollary of the following result,
which is the tragedy of the commons for the scaled model:
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Theorem 3. Assume that H1 and H2 hold, and assume that the initial condition
of (16) − (20) is such that x2(0) > 0; that is, the cheater is present initially. Then
(p(t), e(t), x1(t), x2(t))→ (0, 0, 0, 0) as t→∞.
Proof. Given the initial condition, we can find an  ≥ 0 such that the solution
(s(t), p(t), e(t), x1(t), x2(t)) is contained in the compact set Ω for all t ≥ 0. We shall
present two proofs. The first involves a (biologically nontrivial) transformation
of one of the system’s variables. The second considers the ratio of cooperators and
cheaters, a biologically natural measure, and reveals that this ratio does not increase.
Proof 1: Consider the variable y2 = x
q
2. Then
dy2
dt
(t) = y2(qf(p)− qD(t))
Equation (19), and the above equation can be integrated:
x1(t) = x1(0) e
∫ t
0 qf(p(τ))−D(τ)dτ
y2(t) = y2(0) e
∫ t
0 qf(p(τ))−qD(τ)dτ > 0, for all t since y2(0) = x
q
2(0) > 0,
Dividing the first by the second equation yields:
x1(t) = y2(t)
x1(0)
y2(0)
e−(1−q)
∫ t
0 D(τ)dτ ≤ Bx1(0)
y2(0)
e−(1−q)Dt,
where we have used the lower bound for D(t), see H2, to establish the last in-
equality, and the positive bound B for y2(t) which exists because the solution, and
therefore also x2(t), is bounded. From this follows that limt→∞ x1(t) = 0, where the
convergence is at least exponential with rate (1− q)D.
Next we consider the dynamics of the variable z = Qx1 − e, where Q = (1− q)/q:
z˙ = −D(t)z,
which is solvable, yielding z(t) = z(0) e−
∫ t
0 D(τ)dτ . The lower bound D for D(t) in
H2, then implies that z(t)→ 0 at a rate which is at least exponential with rate D.
This fact, together with the convergence of x1(t) to zero established above, implies
that e(t)→ 0 as well.
Next, consider the p-equation (17). There holds that for each ˜ > 0:
dp
dt
(t) ≤ ˜−Dp, for all sufficiently large t.
Notice that we used that g(0, s) = 0 for all s ≥ 0, and the continuity of g, see H1,
as well as H2 for the lower bound of D(t). It follows that lim supt→∞ p(t) ≤ ˜/D,
and since ˜ > 0 was arbitrary, there follows that p(t)→ 0.
Finally, we consider the x2-equation (20). Since p(t)→ 0 and f(0) = 0 by H1, there
holds that f(p(t)) ≤ D/2 for all t sufficiently large. Consequently,
dx2
dt
(t) ≤ −D
2
x2, for all sufficiently large t,
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and thus x2(t)→ 0, concluding the proof in this case.
Proof 2: Equations (19) and (20) can be integrated:
x1(t) = x1(0) e
∫ t
0 qf(p(τ))−D(τ)dτ (22)
x2(t) = x2(0) e
∫ t
0 f(p(τ))−D(τ)dτ > 0, for all t since x2(0) > 0. (23)
Thus, the ratio r(t) = x1(t)/x2(t) is well-defined and satisfies the differential equa-
tion:
dr
dt
(t) = −(1− q)f(p)r,
which shows that the ratio does not increase. The solution of this equation is:
r(t) = r(0) e−(1−q)
∫ t
0 f(p(τ))dτ (24)
We distinguish two cases depending on the integrability of the function f(p(t)):
Case 1:
∫∞
0
f(p(τ))dτ =∞.
It follows from (24) that r(t) → 0, and hence also x1(t) → 0 because x2(t) is
bounded. Proof of convergence of e(t), p(t) and x2(t) to zero now proceeds as in
Proof 1.
Case 2:
∫∞
0
f(p(τ))dτ <∞.
It follows from (22)−(23) that both x1(t)→ 0 and x2(t)→ 0, because 0 < D ≤ D(t)
for all t, by H2. Proof of convergence of e(t) and p(t) to zero now proceeds as in
Proof 1 as well.
Proof of Theorem 2
By scaling the state variables of system (12)− (15) in the usual way as follows:
s = S
p = P
e =
E
γ
x1 =
X1
γ
,
and switching to lower case letters for the rate functions:
g(s) := G(S)
f(p) := F (P ),
and for the chemostat’s constant operating parameters:
d := D
s0 := S0,
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we obtain the following scaled model:
ds
dt
(t) = d(s0 − s)− eg(s) (25)
dp
dt
(t) = eg(s)− x1f(p)− dp (26)
de
dt
(t) = (1− q)x1f(p)− de (27)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1 (qf(p)− d) (28)
Notice that H1’, which holds for the rate functions G(S) and F (P ), is also valid for
the rate functions g(s) and f(p).
We introduce two new variables:
m = s+ p+ e+ x1 (29)
v = e−Qx1, where Q := 1− q
q
(30)
and choose to drop the s and e-equations from system (25)− (28), transforming it
to:
dm
dt
(t) = d(s0 −m) (31)
dv
dt
(t) = −dv (32)
dp
dt
(t) = (v +Qx1)g(m− p− v − x1/q)− xf(p)− dp (33)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1 (qf(p)− d) (34)
with state space {p, x1 ≥ 0 : m ≥ p+ v + x1/q, v +Qx1 ≥ 0}, which is forward in-
variant. The variables m(t) and v(t) converge exponentially to s0 and 0 respectively,
hence it is natural to study the limiting system:
dp
dt
(t) = Qx1g(s
0 − p− x1/q)− x1f(p)− dp (35)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1(qf(p)− d) (36)
which is defined on the state space {p, x1 ≥ 0 : p + x1/q ≤ s0}, which is forward
invariant. It turns out to be more convenient to transform this system using the
variable:
w = p+
1
q
x1, (37)
instead of the variable p, yielding:
dw
dt
(t) = Qx1g(s
0 − w)− dw (38)
dx1
dt
(t) = x1(qf(w − x1/q)− d) (39)
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with state space Ωred = {x1 ≥ 0 : x1/q ≤ w ≤ s0}, which is forward invariant.
We start our analysis of system (38) − (39) by determining the nullclines. The
w-nullcline is given by:
x1 = h(w), where h(w) =
d
Q
w
g(s0 − w) . (40)
The main properties of the function h(w) : [0, s0)→ R+ are:
1. h(0) = 0, and limw→s0 h(w) =∞.
2. h′(w) = d
Q
g(s0−w)+wg′(s0−w)
g2(s0−w) > 0, by H1’.
3. h′′(w) = d
Q
−wg′′(s0−w)g2(s0−w)+2g(s0−w)g′(s0−w)(g(s0−w)+wg′(s0−w))
g4(s0−w) > 0, by H1
′.
Thus, the function h(w) is zero at zero, is increasing with a vertical asymptote at
w = s0, and it is strictly convex.
To obtain a nontrivial x1-nullcline in the state space, we make one more assump-
tion, namely:
p∗ := f−1
(
d
q
)
satisfies p∗ < s0. (41)
This assumption merely expresses that the cooperator has a break-even steady state
concentration for the processed nutrient at a level below the input nutrient concen-
tration s0, see equation (28). In addition to the horizontal axis x1 = 0, there is a
nontrivial x1-nullcline which is particularly easy to express using p
∗, as the graph of
a linear function:
x1 = q(w − p∗). (42)
Any nonzero steady states of the limiting system are given by the intersection of
the w- and the nontrivial x1-nullcine, which are determined by the solutions of the
equation:
h(w) = q(w − p∗), 0 ≤ w < s0. (43)
In view of the convexity of the function h, there are either no, one, or two solutions
to (43), and generically there are none, or two. We will construct the phase portrait
of the limiting system in these two cases.
Lemma 1. Suppose that H1’ and (41) hold.
1. If equation (43) has no solutions, then system (38)− (39) has a unique steady
state (0, 0) which is globally asymptotically stable with respect to initial condi-
tions in Ωred.
2. If equation (43) has two solutions w1 < w2, then system (38) − (39) has 3
steady states, (0, 0), (w1, h(w1)) and (w2, h(w2)). The steady states (0, 0) and
(w2, h(w2)) are locally asymptotically stable, and (w1, h(w1)) is a saddle with
one-dimensional stable manifold Ws, and one-dimensional unstable manifold
Wu. The stable manifold Ws intersects the boundary of Ωred in two points,
one on the boundary x1 = qw, the other on the boundary w = s
0, forming
a separatrix: Initial conditions below Ws give rise to solutions converging to
(0, 0), whereas initial conditions above Ws give rise to solutions converging to
(w2, h(w2)), yielding bistability in the limiting system, see Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Phase plane of the limiting system (38)−(39) in case there are two nonzero
steady states.
Proof. 1. If (43) has no solutions, then the w-nullcline and the nontrivial x1-
nullcline do not intersect, and thus (0, 0) is the only steady state of the system.
The state space Ωred is divided in 3 parts by the two nullclines, and it is easy
to see that the region enclosed between both nullclines and the boundary of
Ωred is a trapping region in which solutions monotonically converge to the
zero steady state. Solutions starting in the region above the w-nullcline are
monotonically decreasing (increasing) in the x1-component (w-component),
but since that region does not contain nontrivial steady states, these solutions
must enter the trapping region between both nullclines. Similarly, solutions
that start below the x1-nullcline are monotonically increasing (decreasing) in
the x1-component (w-component), and must enter the trapping region as well.
This concludes the proof of the assertion that (0, 0) is a globally asymptotically
stable steady state.
2. If equation (43) has two solutions w1 < w2, then the nullclines intersect in two
distinct points, yielding the positive steady states (w1, h(w1)) and (w2, h(w2)),
see Figure 4. The third steady state is (0, 0). It is not hard to see that the
state space is now divided into 5 parts, 3 of which are trapping regions. Each
of these trapping regions is enclosed by arcs of the nullclines or segments of the
boundary of Ωred which either connect pairs of steady states, or a steady state
and a point on the boundary of the state space Ωred, see Figure 4. There are
also 2 remaining regions, which we call the NW and SE regions, for obvious
reasons.
To complete the phase plane analysis, we perform a linearization of the system
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at the steady states. The Jacobian matrix of the limiting system is(−Qx1g′(s0 − w)− d Qg(s0 − w)
x1qf
′(w − x1/q) (qf(w − x1/q)− d)− x1f ′(w − x1/q)
)
We focus on the middle steady state (w1, h(w1)), where the Jacobian evaluates
to:
J1 =
(
−d
(
w1g′(s0−w1)
g(s0−w1) + 1
)
Qg(s0 − w)
d
Q
q w1
g(s0−w1)f
′(p∗) − d
Q
w1
g(s0−w1)f
′(p∗)
)
Clearly, the trace is negative, and the determinant is given by:
d
Q
w1
g(s0 − w1)f
′(p∗)
[
d
(
w1g
′(s0 − w1)
g(s0 − w1) + 1
)
− qQg(s0 − w1)
]
We claim that this determinant is negative, which implies that this steady
state is a saddle. This follows from the fact that the slope of the tangent line
to the graph of the convex function h(w) at w = w1 must be smaller than the
slope of the line x1 = q(w − p∗), which is of course q:
h′(w1) < q.
Recalling the derivative of h(w) given above, it can be shown that this lat-
ter inequality is equivalent to the expression in the square brackets in the
determinant being negative, which establishes the claim.
Incidentally, a similar argument can be used to show that the determinant of
the linearization at the steady state (w2, h(w2)) is positive, because in this case
h′(w2) > q. Since the trace of that linearization is also negative, this shows
that (w2, h(w2)) is locally asymptotically stable. The linearization at (0, 0)
is triangular with both diagonal entries equal to −d, from which also follows
that (0, 0) is locally asymptotically stable.
Now we turn to the question of the location of the one-dimensional stable
and unstable manifolds Ws, respectively Wu, of the saddle. Therefore, we
determine the eigenvectors of the negative eigenvalue λ1, and the positive
eigenvalue λ2 of the Jacobian matrix J1. We have that
J1
(
1
r1
)
= λ1
(
1
r1
)
with λ1 < 0, and J1
(
1
r2
)
= λ2
(
1
r2
)
, with λ2 > 0,
where we wish to determine, or at least estimate, r1 and r2. We can find r1
by considering the first of the two equations determining λ1:
r1 =
1
g(s0 − w)
(
λ1 + d
(
w1g
′(s0 − w1)
g(s0 − w1) + 1
))
.
We claim that r1 < 0. Indeed, since the trace of J1 (which equals λ1 +
λ2) is less than the top-left entry of J1, it follows that the expression in the
large parentheses is less than −λ2, which is negative. This implies that near
(w1, h(w1)), the stable manifold has a branch in the NW, and another branch
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in the SE region. Backward integration of solutions starting near the saddle
and on Ws in these regions, shows that they must either exit these regions
along the boundary of Ωred (because backward-time solutions cannot exit via
the trapping regions), or they must converge to a steady state. However, there
are no steady states to the NW of the saddle in the NW region, nor to the SE
of the saddle in the SE region. Thus, the stable manifold Ws must intersect
the boundary of Ωred in two points, one on the line x1 = qw, and the other on
the line w = s0. Next, we focus on the location of the unstable manifold Wu
of the saddle, whose location is determined by r2. We claim that:
h′(w1) < r2 < q.
To see this we consider the first equation in the eigenvalue equation for λ2,
by solving for r2, once again recalling the expression of the derivative of the
function h:
r2 =
λ2
Qg(s0 − w1) + h
′(w1),
from which the first inequality follows because λ2 > 0. The second equation
in the eigenvalue equation yields that:
r2 = q
h(w1)f
′(p∗)
h(w1)f ′(p∗) + λ2
,
and again, since λ2 > 0, we find that the second inequality holds, as claimed.
We can now fully assemble the phase portrait presented in Figure 4. The stable
manifold Ws of the saddle has a branch in the first and second trapping regions.
Solutions starting on these branches must converge to (0, 0), and (w2, h(w2))
respectively. In fact, it is not hard to see that all solutions in the first trapping
region converge to (0, 0), whereas solutions in the second and third trapping
region converge to (w2, h(w2)). The fate of solutions starting in the NW and
SE regions depends on their initial location relative to the separatrix Ws: They
converge to (0, 0) if they start below Ws, but to (w2, h(w2)) if they start above
Ws, and this occurs because they must enter one of the trapping regions first.
The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of system (38) − (39) described in
Lemma 1 can be translated into the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of system
(35)− (36), and combining this with the theory of asymptotically autonomous sys-
tems, see Appendix F in [25], the asymptotic behavior of the transformed system
(31) − (34) can be obtained as well. In turn, this determines the behavior of the
scaled system (25)− (28), from which Theorem 2 follows immediately.
More general digestion networks
To see why the tragedy continues to hold for more general digestion network, we
consider solutions of system (6)−(11), for which it is easily verified that the variable:
m = s+ p+ e+ 2c+ x1 + x2,
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still satisfies equation (21), implying that the family of compact sets Ω, defined
earlier, is forward invariant for system (6) − (11), for all  ≥ 0, when H2 holds.
Consequently, the proof of Theorem 3 remains valid for the above chemostat model
(6)− (11). Indeed, the first proof only crucially depends on the dynamics of x1 and
x2 to show that x1(t) converges to zero, after which the convergence of e, p and x2 is
obtained by elementary comparison arguments. For the digestion network presented
here, the dynamics of x1 and x2 remain unchanged, hence we can still conclude that
x1(t) converges to zero. After that, it follows from a comparison argument that e+c
converges to zero, and then similarly that p and x2 converge to zero as well. One
could also easily adapt the steps of the second proof to obtain the same conclusion.
20
References
[1] K.L. Asfahl, and M. Schuster, Social interactions in bacterial cell-cell signaling,
FEMS Microbiol. Rev. 41(1), p.92-107, 2017.
[2] K.L. Asfahl, J. Walsh, K. Gilbert, and M. Schuster, Non-social adaptation
defers a tragedy of the commons in Pseudomonas aeruginosa quorum sensing,
ISME J. 9, p. 1734-1746, 2015.
[3] J.S. Chuang, O. Rivoire, and S. Leibler, Simpson’s paradox in a synthetic
microbial system, Science 323(5911), p.272-275, 2009.
[4] R. Cressman, and Y. Tao, The replicator equation and other game dynamics,
PNAS 111, p. 10810-10817, 2014.
[5] A.A. Dandekar, S. Chugani, and E.P. Greenberg, Bacterial quorum sensing
and metabolic incentives to cooperate, Science 338(6104), p.264-266, 2012.
[6] S.P. Diggle, A.S. Griffin, G.S. Campbell, and S.A. West, Cooperation and
conflict in quorum-sensing bacterial populations, Nature 450(7168), p.411-414,
2007.
[7] F. Fiegna, and G.J. Velicer, Competitive fates of bacterial social parasites:
persistence and self-induced extinction of Myxococcus xanthus cheaters, Proc.
Biol. Sci. 270(1523), p.1527-1534, 2003.
[8] F. Fiegna, Y.T. Yu, S.V. Kadam, and G.J. Velicer, Evolution of an obligate
social cheater to a superior cooperator, Nature 441(7091), p.310-314, 2006.
[9] K.R. Foster, K. Parkinson, and C.R. Thompson, What can microbial genetics
teach sociobiology?, Trends Genet. 23(2), p. 74-80, 2007.
[10] K.R. Foster, S. Shaulsky, J.E. Strassmann, D.C. Queller, and C.R. Thompson,
Pleiotropy as a mechanism to stabilize cooperation, Nature 431(7009), p.693-
696, 2004.
[11] S.A. Frank, Foundations of social evolution, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NY, 1998.
[12] J. Gore, H. Youk, and A. van Oudenaarden, Snowdrift game dynamics and
facultative cheating in yeast, Nature 459(7244), p.253-256 (2009).
[13] D. Greig, and M. Travisano, The Prisoner’s Dilemma and polymorphism in
yeast SUC genes, Proc. Biol. Sci. 271 Suppl. 3: S25-26, 2004.
[14] A.S. Griffin, S.A. West, and A. Buckling, Cooperation and competition in
pathogenic bacteria, Nature 430 (7003), p.1024-1027, 2004.
[15] G.R. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (3859), p. 1243-1248,
1968.
21
[16] G.R. Hardin, Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoner’s dilemma, Behav.
Sci. 16, p. 472-481, 1971.
[17] R. Kummerli, and S.P. Brown, Molecular and regulatory properties of a public
good shape the evolution of cooperation, Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 107, p.
18921-18926, 2010.
[18] L. Lehmann, and L. Keller, The evolution of cooperation and altruism–a gen-
eral framework and a classification of models, J. Evol. Biol. 19(5), p. 1365-1376,
2006.
[19] W. F. Lloyd, Two Lectures on the Checks to Population (Oxford Univ. Press,
Oxford, Eng- land, 1833), reprinted (in part, in: Population, Evolution, and
Birth Control, G. Hardin, Ed. (Freeman, San Francisco, 1964), p. 37.
[20] R.C. MacLean, and I. Gudelj, Resource competition and social conflict in
experimental populations of yeast, Nature 441(7092), p. 498-501, 2006.
[21] S,J. Martin, M. Beekman, T.C. Wossler, and F.L. Ratnieks, Parasitic Cape
honeybee workers, Apis mellifera capensis, evade policing, Nature 415(6868),
p.163-165, 2002.
[22] P.B. Rainey,and K. Rainey, Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experi-
mental bacterial populations, Nature 425 (6953), p.72-74, 2003.
[23] D.J. Rankin, K. Bargum, and H. Kokko, The tragedy of the commons in
evolutionary biology, Trends Ecol. Evol. 22(12), p.643-651, 2007.
[24] K.M. Sandoz, S.M. Mitzimberg, and M. Schuster, Social cheating in Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa quorum sensing, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 104(40), p.
15876-15881, 2007.
[25] H.L. Smith, and P. Waltman, The Theory of the Chemostat (Dynamics of
Microbial Competition), Cambridge University Press, 1995.
[26] A.J. Waite, and W. Shou, Adaptation to a new environment allows cooperators
to purge cheaters stochastically, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109(47), p.19079-
19086, 2012.
[27] M. Wang, A.L. Schaefer, A.A. Dandekar, and E.P. Greenberg, Quorum sensing
and policing of Pseudomonas aeruginosa social cheaters, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 112(7), p. 2187-2191(2015).
[28] S.A. West, S.P. Diggle, A. Buckling, A. Gardner, and A.S. Griffins, The social
lives of microbes. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 38, p. 53-77, 2007.
[29] S.A. West, A.S. Griffin, and A. Gardner, Evolutionary explanations for coop-
eration, Curr. Biol. 17(16), p. 661-672, 2007.
[30] S.A. West, A.S. Griffin, A. Gardner, and S.P. Diggle, Social evolution theory
for microorganisms, Nat. Rev. Microbiol. 4(8), p.597-607, 2006.
22
[31] J.B. Xavier, W. Kim, and K.R. Foster, A molecular mechanism that stabilizes
cooperative secretions in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Mol.Microbiol. 79, p.166-
179, 2011.
23
